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Disempowering Minorities:
A Critique of Wilkinson's 'Task for
Social Scientists and Practitioners'
MITCH BERBRIER
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Department of Sociology
In this article, I examine Wilkinson's (2000) injunction that practitioners
"omit entirely the 'minority' concept" (pp. 124-25). I maintain that Wil-
kinson's argument disempowers groups-such as gays and the disabled-
who have used a "minority" identity effectively, and speciously indicates
that African-Americans would benefit from such retrenchment, thereby
implying that social justice is a zero-sum game. Rather, "minority" coali-
tions are effectively pursuing justice for all. Moreover, Wilkinson's de-
construction of "minority" conflates conceptual breadth with conceptual
vagueness, and conveniently ignores (or denies) the socially constructed
character of "race" and "ethnicity." I suggest that practitioners learn more
about the historical development of all of these concepts and honor clients
who self-identify as "minority" group members, lest they become alienated
from them.
"I didn't raise my son to sit on the back of the bus. You get in there
and fight for your rights." (from the movie Philadelphia, 1993)
Continued attempts to connect, at any level, disabilities, sexual orien-
tation, race, ethnicity, economic position, and gender under a vague
symbol is prejudicial and unreasonable. (Wilkinson 2000, p. 127,
emphasis added)
Why are so many people attached to their marginality and why
is so much of their intellectual labor spent developing theories to
justify it? Why insist on difference with such rigidity, rancor, and
blindness, to the exclusion of the possibility of common knowledge
and common dreams? (Gitlin 1995, p. 32)
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Introduction
When, in the summer of 2000, I first happened upon Doris
Wilkinson's article "Rethinking the Concept of 'Minority': A Task
for Social Scientists and Practitioners," I was excited to find that
another sociologist was working on the meaning of "minority
status." Just a year earlier I had done another literature search
and found virtually nothing along these lines (from sociologists!).
Based on the title, I eagerly anticipated a thesis that would "re-
think" the concept. However upon reading the article I found
myself frequently confused and disappointed by the approach
taken by my esteemed colleague. While implying that her pur-
suits are "objective" (p. 115), Dr. Wilkinson here puts the activist
cart before the analytic horse, leaving out crucial information that
oversimplifies the issues involved and renders her arguments
both errant and polemical. The result is a paper that misleads
practitioners into thinking that the minority concept is always
useless and/or harmful, when from the perspective of many
pursuing their vision of social justice it most certainly is neither.
All of this is not to say that I found the article entirely without
merit. Dr. Wilkinson is to be commended for what is to me the
central insight of her paper, which is to follow Nibert's (1995) lead
in indicating that "the minority concept" can at times be obfus-
cating rather than clarifying. Specifically, Wilkinson argues that
people often use the term "minority" when they mean African-
Americans. This critique of euphemistic obfuscation is entirely
appropriate: Practitioners, and the rest of us, ought always say
what we mean. We ought not speak of "minorities" when we
mean "Blacks." Dr. Wilkinson also correctly points out that there
are important differences in both the historical treatment and cur-
rent circumstances of the descendants of Africans in America, and
that those might sometimes be ignored in a leveling of all groups
under the rubric of "minority." To the extent that the excessive and
liberal use of "minority" fosters ignorance of important differ-
ences between socially recognized groups, such problems ought
be addressed, and Wilkinson does us all a service to point this out.
(On the other hand, I argue below that that danger similarly exists
in categorizing African-Americans with groups under the rubrics
of "race" or "ethnicity." This Wilkinson chooses mysteriously-
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given Wilkinson and King 1987-to ignore.) Finally, Dr. Wilkinson
also humbly subjects her own work to critique, indicating that
she too has used "minority" where she might have preferred to
use "race" or "ethnic," and pointing out how we social scientists
are forced to use terminology, sometimes based on editorial or
reviewer constraint, that we might otherwise eschew.
So practitioners (and the rest of us) should heed Wilkinson's
call to refer to Blacks as Blacks and not euphemistically as "mi-
norities"; but we should all be wary of throwing the minority
baby out with the minority bathwater (unless that is exactly what
we want to do).
A Brief History of the Broadening
"Minority" Concept in America
"Frequently 'minority' indicates only races (African Americans) or
ethnic populations (Hispanics, Asians). At times, it extends to occu-
pationally subordinated groups (e.g. women) and socially isolated
populations. Multiracial persons (biracial) and economically de-
pressed persons (unemployed, poor)... Sexual orientation, phys-
ical handicapped status, and being white and male or female are
similarly classified." (Wilkinson 2000, p. 119)
One of Professor Wilkinson's problems with "minority" seems
to be that it is a concept that is significantly broader than "race" and
"ethnicity." Leaving aside her choice here to include Asians as an
ethnic-but-not-racial group, I believe Wilkinson here accurately
represents the breadth not of the minority concept, but of claims
to the minority concept. She indicates here that "minority" is
"extended" to her list of groups. We are not given a specific
indication here of who is doing the extending, but I believe that
that is important. That is, what is really sociologically important
and interesting here is that so many groups are indeed claiming
minority status (Berbrier forthcoming). Wilkinson gives short
shrift to this crucial issue, thereby failing to incorporate a careful
analysis of how and why the minority concept achieved its histor-
ical role and cultural resonance. I put it forth as axiomatic that
an understanding of its history and (resulting) obdurate social
reality would aid practitioners in deciding how and when to use
the term "minority."
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While the first sociological use of the term is usually traced
to Donald Young (1932), it was Louis Wirth's (1945) landmark
definition-as Wilkinson does note-that clearly became the stan-
dard, widely cited and extraordinarily influential on the socio-
logical study of race and ethnicity (McKee 1993). Wirth held that
"minority" refers to:
"A group of people who, because of their physical or cultural char-
acteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which
they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore
regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination." (1945,
p. 347).
On one level this definition was perhaps the initial effort to de-
nude the term of its numerical connotation and replace it with one
of social and economic power. However, Wirth's defining took
place in a social context and, as Benton Meyers argued, Wirth
was initially trying to distinguish American "minorities" from
the idea of a "national minority" (e.g. Albanians in Yugoslavia
or Chechens in Russia) in order to lend credence to his [Wirth's]
assimilationist view that "minorities need not be disloyal to the
state in which they live" and that "they need not have any ambi-
tions to found a state of their own" (Meyers 1984, p. 5). Thus, the
"meaning" of term was both controversial and expanding from
its very conception.
The Civil Rights Movement of African-Americans became
perhaps the crucial historical turning point for the "minority"
concept. Historian Earl Lewis (2000) indicates that while African-
Americans have been referred to as a "minority" since about 1930,
this application was not prevalent until the 1960s. He argues
that until Africans came to be considered a part of the nation,
rather than alien to it, they could not be considered a minority
group within it. Therefore, given the understanding of "minority
status" derived from Wirth's definition-with its emphasis on
unequal treatment and discrimination-once deemed eligible for
minority status, Africans in America immediately became the
best example of it, and as the Civil Rights Movement progressed,
"minority" became virtually synonymous with "Black" (Gleason
1991). Moreover, by the 1970's "minority" became in effect a
"code word" for "Black": If people referred to "minorities" they
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very often meant (and, as Wilkinson indicates, many still mean)
African-Americans (Lewis 2000).
However, as we know, the Civil Rights Movement impacted
not only the status of African-Americans in this society but many,
if not all, movements for social justice (Colburn and Pozzetta
1994). Thus, since the 1960's many "minority" groups who had
been frequently also labeled "racial" and/or "ethnic" began to
more actively and successfully stake a wide variety of claims,
many of these building on the foundation laid by American Blacks
(see e.g. Espiritu 1992 on Asian-Americans; and Nagel 1996 on
Native-Americans). At the same time, many non-racial and non-
ethnic groups-often so-called "deviant" groups-also began to
claim minority rather than a deviant status (Berbrier forthcom-
ing), and frequently with the help of professional sociologists.
For example, in 1971 the sociologist Edward Sagarin edited a book
entitled The Other Minorities: Nonethnic Collectivities Conceptualized
as Minorities. In this book we see the development of the claim
that both "racial and ethnic" and these "Other" groups (e.g.
women, homosexuals, the disabled, and hippies) were effectively
"minority" groups.
How could such claims be made? It turns out that the clear
favorite intellectual basis for the claim was Wirth's (1945) clas-
sic definition. While Wirth had himself specified "ethnic, racial,
national and religious" groups (p. 350) as the types of minorities,
his abstract social scientific operational definition left open the
door to the possibility of what we may call "minority status
claims-making" (cf. Best 1995; Loseke 1999). That is, by defining
a subjectively perceived "differential and unequal treatment" as
the main criterion for minority status, his operational definition was
sufficiently broad and abstract that "Others" would use it to lay
claim to the territory. In order to ground their claim in an essential
reality, Sagarin and several of his contributors deployed similar
abstract definitions that specified criteria for "minority status,"
and applied these to the Other groups, almost invariably finding
that the term "minority" was indeed applicable. Thus, Sagarin's
volume is a testament to this kind of minority-status claims-
making (as was Robert Winslow's 1972 reader The Emergence
of Deviant Minorities, which also drew explicitly upon Wirth's
definition), and began a form of activism that has continued to the
8 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
present (Berbrier, forthcoming). Note that this is a long-standing
form of activism, and not a "recent interpretation" of the minority
concept as Wilkinson would have it (p. 123); the first documented
use of the term with respect to gays, for example, was over fifty
years ago (Cory 1951). In the intervening years-as Wilkinson
notes with some displeasure-numerous non-"racial" and non-
"ethnic" groups have utilized the injury and oppression implied
by the minority concept to press claims for social justice.
Minority vs. Race vs. Ethnic
(1) On Operational Definitions and Status Claims
From the outset, Professor Wilkinson wishes to convince us
that her concerns about the minority concept are based on gen-
erally accepted principles of social science: "As an abstraction
most often regarded as virtually synonymous with race, 'mi-
nority' is actually nonscientific and devoid of conceptual clarity
and empirical validity" (p. 115). Her first argument here is that
"minority" is used synonymously with "race." To support it,
Wilkinson cites research articles that use the term "minority"
to refer to specific groups that Wilkinson would presumably
classify as "races." However, the data she then presents actually
speak more directly (and accurately) to the point that it is people-
in-society (and not only researchers) who frequently neglect to
make distinctions between terms like "minority," "ethnicity," and
"race." (She analyzes more discourse from journalistic sources-
William Raspberry, USA Today-than academic ones). While I
believe that Wilkinson is properly concerned about this issue,
this fact of (what we may think of as) poor terminological choices
does not preclude the possibility that the term "minority" is (or
can or ought to be) used more carefully by researchers, or people-
in-society, or practitioners.
Wilkinson's second point here also appears reasonable, at first
glance. Concerns regarding valid operational definition and reli-
able measurement of abstract concepts are longstanding in the so-
cial sciences and few would question the aim of developing terms
that are conceptually clear. The problem here is that Wilkinson
seems to see lack of clarity and validity through an extraordinarily
selective lens: the "minority" concept is curiously singled out. As
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mentioned above, one of Wilkinson's central themes is that the
concept of "minority" is just too broad. As she writes:
"Groups so defined have very few shared attributes with respect
to race, ethnicity, social class, gender, sexuality, and/or culture.
In other words, minimal social and behavioral traits are held in
common. Most groups detailed as minorities have separate class positions,
racial and ethnic origins, family backgrounds, and lifestyles" (p. 122,
emphasis added).
While everything Wilkinson says here seems to be true, there is
absolutely no basis for assailing the "minority" concept as the
problem. That is, one could easily compose an isomorphic sen-
tence about "culture" or "race"-two terms she notably assumes
to be unproblematic-that make about as much sense. Thus, if I tell
you that "most groups detailed as 'cultural groups' have separate class
positions, racial and ethnic origins, family backgrounds, and lifestyles,"
should we therefore get rid of the "culture" concept?? Indeed,
there are few broader terms in our lexicon than culture, yet we do
not claim its meaninglessness; rather we decry its misrepresenta-
tion. Similarly, I might argue that most groups detailed as "races"
have separate class positions, ethnic origins, family backgrounds,
and lifestyles. Do we therefore get rid of the concept of "race"?
Obviously, if we take to Wilkinson's logic, we will lose a number
of important sociological concepts, and quickly.
Wilkinson's argument that all "minority concepts" rely on
ideas that are unscientific ("the category lacks concrete indicators
and its miscellaneous attributes tend to be flawed and conflict-
ing" [p. 119]) thus seems to be confusing breadth with a lack
of scientific verifiability. One wonders by what standard Wirth's
definition of minority is not as empirically verifiable as extant def-
initions of "race" or "ethnicity." Relatively speaking Wirth's def-
inition is fairly clear (at least he provides one), and given the
plethora of operational definitions of ethnicity and race (e.g.
Isajiw 1974,1994; Smith 1996), it seems unfair to single out Wirth's
minority concept, or those that follow directly from it, for ambi-
guity. The definitions of minority are broad-and intentionally
so!-but that does not make them vague.
Furthermore, any group-or any putatively objective re-
searcher-can make claims to minority status (or to "ethnic" or
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"racial" status for that matter). In theory, each claimant must
either adhere to the operational definition or risk that her or his
claim will not be recognized as legitimate. For example, Deaf
and Gay activists who claim minority status might have their
claims recognized more readily than, say, white males who claim
to be a minority (Berbrier forthcoming; 1998a) because both social
scientists and people-in-society are more likely to recognize the le-
gitimacy of their claims to "subordination" and "discrimination."
If there is a debate then, it would be about the accuracy of the
claims, not the reasonableness of the operational definition. That
is what Wilkinson crucially omits: Just because representatives
of many and diverse groups claim minority (or "cultural" or
"racial") status does not make those concepts any more or less
scientifically valid. Indeed, since that initial deployment in 1951,
gay rhetors have regularly explicitly drawn upon a Wirthian
notion of minority status to posit very specific operational criteria by
which one would judge gays to be a "minority" group (e.g. Herek
1993; Kameny 1971), and I have noted a similar pattern among
the Deaf (Berbrier 1998b). Wilkinson, it seems, would define such
social movement framing out of existence.
Now, it bears pointing out that "minority" as it is usually used,
is not only a broader level concept (vs. race and ethnicity). That
is, one thing that the minority concept does that neither the race
nor ethnic concepts do is to specifically exclude the powerful. The
contemporary definitions that Wilkinson cites bear this out-for
example, Farley, in the 1995 edition of his textbook, defining a
"minority" as a group that "has restricted power and an inferior
status". "Race" usually includes the dominant as well as the sub-
ordinate, or following Nibert (1995) the privileged as well as the
oppressed (as in the "white" race). "Minority," by either Wirth's
or Farley's definition, particularly excludes the dominant and/or
privileged. Hence, one might argue that because it definitively
excludes the dominant and powerful, the "minority" concept can
be (and has been) effective in uniting diverse oppressed groups.
From this perspective, by advocating the removal of the term
from the vocabulary of social justice pursuits, Wilkinson effec-
tively advocates a form of unilateral disarmament (by the already
relatively powerless).
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(2) On Categories: Separating African-Americans from (Other)
Minorities
Intermingling handicapped status, health conditions, and behaviors
with race and ethnic heritage is problematic, unwarranted, and
unfair to heretofore disenfranchised racial and ethnic populations.
(p. 129)
Another element of Wilkinson's critique of the broad interpre-
tation of "minority" is that it is African-Americans who are hurt:
It results in a leveling of grievances and victimization among
all groups, and since African-Americans have historically been
and continue to be the victims of the most insidious racism, then
there ought to be a separation of Blacks from others in policy and
social service considerations. She asserts that we must recognize
"hierarchies of need" (p. 130).
Indeed, the minority concept may, in a sense, level all those
considered minorities: African-Americans are put in the same
category as gays, the disabled, Latino-, Native-, and Asian-
Americans. But it is unclear how the categories of "race" or
"ethnicity" do any less (or, for that matter, how a pan-ethnic
category like "Asian" does not do the same to subgroups such
as the Hmong [Hurh and Kim 19891). Thus, when Wilkinson
writes that "only one population assigned minority status in the
Americas has ever been subjected to slavery and centuries of
systemic racism" (p. 122, emphasis added), I could again replace
the term "minority" with either "race" or "ethnicity" and the
statement would have similar implications: "Only one population
assigned racial/ethnic status in the Americas has ever been subjected
to slavery and centuries of systemic racism." Whether as "minority"
or "race" most people would likely immediately recognize that
both Wilkinson and I are referring to African-Americans; yet in
my example Blacks still are put in the same category as, say, Asian-
Americans. The "hierarchy of need" applies to either categori-
cal assignment. If we are talking about a zero-sum competition
among disadvantaged groups for scarce resources (a question-
able assumption), then the "minority" (or "race" or "ethnicity")
concept may indeed disadvantage African Americans, or at least
give insufficient attention to the particular history and plight of
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Blacks in America. However, even granting Wilkinson's point,
this does not discredit the minority concept any more than the
related concepts (although it may increase the number of people
dividing up the zero-sum pot).
Think about it this way: one might argue that the experiences
of (non-African-American) gays and of (heterosexual) African-
Americans are different. Yet if one were so inclined, one might
also argue that the experiences of a Black female engineer in
Burlington, Vermont and a Black male construction worker in
Birmingham, Alabama are different (not to mention the differ-
ent experiences of gays in these places!). We could continue to
parse out more and more specific identities until, we get down to
Identity-the individual. This approach turns sociology slowly
into psychotherapy: "it's all your own subjective experience, ev-
erybody's experiences are different, everyone reacts differently
to it, etc.. ." I imagine Wilkinson does not want to take us down
that road.
My point is that of course the Black female engineer in Vermont
and the Black male construction worker in Alabama also likely
share certain cultural experiences and are also reacted to in similar
patterned ways by others: that is what holds them together. That is
what we all, including (I believe) Wilkinson, are recognizing when
we say that it is meaningful to categorize these people together
as "African-Americans." That is why sociologists can reasonably
speak of groups or of collectivities in the first place. Presumably,
when Wilkinson argues that it is meaningful to categorize people
by "race," "ethnicity," "class," and "gender," she is implying the
same: that all those classified within a race, ethnicity, class, and
gender share something-but not everything! (For that "some-
thing" we would need to know Wilkinson's operational definition
of race, ethnicity, class, and gender). Certainly, these people are
not all the same, and each of these categories comprise many
different kinds of people from many different segments of society.
The concept of minority follows an identical logic! It holds
that anyone can see that there are differences between white
gay males and Black heterosexual females, and that there is also
something they share-such as experiences of discrimination,
of hatred, of fear of violent attack, of rights-violations-just for
being who they are. For some this has come to be understood,
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in effect, as the "minority" experience, and they often argue
that there is something to be gained by recognizing the broad
patterns in society that lead to this. The term becomes a resource
by which people can then work together on certain things that
they share-e.g. perhaps the need for hate-crimes legislation, anti-
discrimination enforcement, or sensitivity training for criminal
justice workers.
Wilkinson seems to assume that throwing out the minority
concept entirely will somehow lead to a greater good, or at least a
greater good for African Americans. Clearly I am skeptical about
whether the pursuit of social justice is this kind of zero-sum com-
petition. In Professor Wilkinson's view of the world, there is no
minority baby, only minority bathwater. I believe that the concern
ought rather be that the euphemistic use of minority instead of
Black causes leveling; if minority were used more judiciously
perhaps to include Blacks (but not become all that Blacks are) then
it might be less of a leveler and more of a coalition concept-
a Rainbow Coalition, if you will, or a Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights. While there surely may be instances when such
separation would benefit Blacks, others would argue-as William
Julius Wilson does in The Bridge Over the Racial Divide (1999)-that
the lack of common cause and common front with others claiming
victim status will ultimately hinder the path toward social justice
for all, including and perhaps especially for African-Americans
(cf. Wilson 1999, p. 8). I would suggest that there might be times
when African American political activists will find it much more
efficacious to combine efforts with others-be these other "racial"
or "ethnic" groups such as Latinos (e.g. Affirmative Action in
California), or with gays (e.g. hate crimes legislation). Yet Wilkin-
son seems to point us in a different direction, arguing that such
attempts at connecting groups "at any level" are "prejudicial and
unreasonable" (p. 127).
I wonder why Dr. Wilkinson prefers a hierarchy of need rather
than an umbrella minority concept. Why not a hierarchy of need
in addition to minority coalitions? I am flummoxed. Wilkinson
seems to be miffed that some are groups making progress by
using "minority status" claims, and she presumes this advantage
is gained at the expense of African-Americans rather than, say,
the privileged groups in society, or at the expense of no one at all.
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(3) On Ontological Gerrymandering and the Social Construction of
Categorical Statuses
"Ethnic affiliation and racial attachment, as opposed to externally
ascribed 'minority' status, are essential parallels with social place-
ment and self-images." (Wilkinson 2000:117, emphasis added).
In a classic critique, Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) take those
who deconstruct concepts and practices to task when they, in
effect, play favorites by assuming the validity of some concepts
while failing to apply symmetrical critical analysis to others
(Bloor 1991). While we are likely all guilty of this at times, this
problem is especially of concern when the concepts are conceptu-
ally linked (e.g. psychology vs. parapsychology [Allison 19791, or
science vs. religion [Gieryn 1983]). In the context of Wilkinson's
paper, we might observe here that there is no reason whatsoever
to believe that "race" or "ethnicity" are any more real, or any
less "political" conceptions than "minority status." Yet Wilkinson
seems entirely comfortable with that assumption.'
One suspects however that these concepts are indeed just as
real and just as political, YET somehow in ways that are more to
Wilkinson's liking, and hence not subject to her analytical skills.
Wilkinson thus ably deconstructs the minority concept, but some
of her key weapons are the putative inherent reality of "ethnic-
ity" and "race," exhorting in her conclusion that "researchers,
clinicians, and teachers must seek ways to incorporate race and
ethnicity in all relevant contexts and omit entirely the 'minority'
concept" (pp. 124-25).
Wilkinson thus essentializes race and ethnicity, while de-
constructing minority status. But on what basis? The dynamic
and burgeoning interdisciplinary literature on the construction
of such "categorical statuses" (Calhoun 1993) indicates extraor-
dinary fluidity in concepts of ethnicity, race, and nation, as well
as minority status (Berbrier forthcoming; Hobsbawm 1990; Davis
1991; Nagel 1994; Loveman 1999; Rockquemore and Brunsma,
2002; Roosens 1989; Stern and Cicala 1991). Each of these terms
have a history. "Race" once distinguished the Irish from the Jews;
now it combines them (Brodkin 1998; Jacobson 1998).The distinc-
tion between "race" and "ethnicity" was initially made eighty
years ago (Woofter 1933) to recognize the different histories of
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American Blacks and white immigrants, yet came to connote
the absence vs. presence of culture, and to reflect many white
Americans' (and white sociologists') long-standing prejudicial
assumption that African-Americans had long ago lost-and thus
no longer possessed-any distinct culture, other than "Ameri-
can" (McKee 1993). "Ethnics," on the other hand, came to be
immigrants and active carriers of vibrant and distinctive cultures
from other places. As a distinct African-American culture came in-
creasingly to be recognized, "ethnicity" (as well as "race") would
be used to describe them as well (e.g. Singer 1962 )-a point of
significant contention (Bonilla-Silva 1999; Loveman 1999; Omi
and Winant 1994; Wilkinson and King 1987). My point is that
over the years, these terms-"minority," "race," and "ethnic"-
have all become common forms of identification both in sociology
and in the wider culture. The distinctions among all of them have
long been murky, contested, variable and politically charged. The
inevitable conclusion from any examination of the literature is
that "race" and "ethnicity" concepts are no more ontologically
suspect than "minority" ones. Minority is a broader concept,
and perhaps more culturally resonant (Berbrier 1998c; Snow and
Benford 2000), but that makes it no less real. Indeed, some might
argue that it is its very resonance, force, and obduracy that make
the idea of minority most "real"-sociologically speaking (Latour
1987). That this empirical observation irritates Wilkinson does not
make it any less empirically observable.
Conclusion
The problems with Wilkinson's piece then, are less the issues
it broaches-which are important and valid-than the extraordi-
narily strident and sweeping conclusions it reaches-which are
overdetermined by the neglect of crucial and complex issues. The
strength of Wilkinson's suggestion is in the idea that people need
to be aware of the constructedness of categories, the fluidity of
their definition, and the danger of assuming members of cate-
gories to be identical. The weakness of her formulation is in her
insufficient assessment of the pragmatic and political aspects of
the term, the obfuscation of her political agenda behind claims to
scientific objectivity and expertise, and in the ontological gerry-
mandering whereby she decries the heterogeneity of those labeled
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"minority" while showing no concern about the heterogeneity of
those labeled "race" and/or "ethnic."
Recommendations
Although I am generally in accord with Nibert's (1996) sug-
gestion that we replace "majority/minority" with "privileged/
oppressed," I advocate here imposing neither the retention nor
the replacement of the "minority" concept. My position is that the
"minority" concept is a social reality to many people in society
and that practitioners would do well to remain sensitive to this,
while working to be clear and direct about what they mean to
say. The existence of broad socially constructed categories of
"races" and "ethnic" groups does not preclude the existence of a
broader socially constructed category of "minority" groups, and
it has turned out that the very breadth of the term has made it
a useful rhetorical resource for coalition politics. This empirical
observation has nothing to do with whether you as a practitioner,
nor Wilkinson or I as academics, like those politics! Furthermore,
it follows that the idea of minority rights is no less real than the
ideas of "racial" or "ethnic" rights. In terms of rights, all of these
might be categorized under the even broader rubric of what we
often call human rights. (And surely Professor Wilkinson would
not have us get rid of that concept too, nor argue that "human"
has no meaning because it is too vague a concept).
In the end, what practitioners have to understand, to get back
to the epigraph and Todd Gitlin's (1995) concerns in The Twilight
of Common Dreams, are the implications of Wilkinson's argument
for the fragmentation of justice activism, and the idea of coalition.
Gitlin is concerned about a balkanization of oppressed peoples
from divergent backgrounds and situations when they would do
better to recognize that they usually aspire to similar dreams of
justice, peace, material well-being, and lives free from the fear
of hate crimes. The pursuit of those is precluded when we over-
emphasize differences, and when we not only emphasize victim
status, but spend most of our energy debating who the most
victimized are rather than pursue justice itself.
Certainly gays and Blacks and Deaf people should not be
reduced to each other. But to ask practitioners to simply stop using
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the term, period-to tell a Deaf or a lesbian client who claims to
be a member of a "minority" group that "you are not a member
of a minority group"-seems, after so many years of struggling
to allow people to identify themselves on their own terms, rather
imperious. I would suggest that practitioners be wary. If the
dominant approach becomes purely what Dr. Wilkinson suggests,
then the result, unless people are very careful, may be severely
strained relations with those who deploy the "minority" label
with vigor and with the aim, in their minds at least, of social
justice and human dignity.
Note
1. Generally I would argue that Woolgar and Pawluch take their idea of onto-
logical gerrymandering way too far-effectively denying the possibility of
talking about any reality-and cast my lot with the "contextual" construc-
tionist school proposed by Best (1993). Nonetheless, I believe that Woolgar
and Pawluch's point has been so influential because it sensitizes us to exactly
the kind of asymmetrical analysis that Bloor (1991) had earlier indicated, and
that I believe Wilkinson is up to, whereby some concepts that are generally
accepted as comparable on the same plane of reality as others, are either
mysteriously, ideologically, or politically favored over those others.
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